Modern Counterintelligence Challenges: Urgent and Complex Threats

Modern counterintelligence faces a full spectrum of sophisticated threats that challenge national security and corporate resiliency alike. Foreign adversaries, including aggressive nation-states like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as non-state actors (organized criminals, hacktivists, and proxies) are launching unprecedented and persistent espionage efforts. Unlike in the past, today’s threats extend well beyond spies stealing military secrets. They encompass cyberattacks, insider leaks, malign influence campaigns, supply chain subversion, economic theft, and more, often in combination. As one former U.S. counterintelligence chief noted, “cyber has merged with [counterintelligence] threats to become one of the main vectors” for foreign espionage. The result is an urgent, complex threat landscape that requires broad awareness and a proactive defense across government, industry, and the public. Below, we illustrate key categories of modern counterintelligence challenges, from insider threats and cyber intrusions to foreign influence operations, supply chain vulnerabilities, economic espionage, and hostile tradecraft; with recent trends and examples highlighting their real-world impact.

1. Insider Threats: The Enemy Within

Insider threats involve trusted individuals with legitimate access to an organization’s facilities, networks, or secrets who wittingly or unwittingly cause harm. This could be a disgruntled employee stealing data, a contractor coerced by a foreign spy, or simply careless staff clicking a malicious link. Insiders have become such a serious hazard that officials warn they must be recognized alongside external cyber and physical threats. Unlike a hacker breaking in from outside, an insider already holds the “keys to the kingdom,” making their betrayal potentially devastating. Critical sectors from government agencies to power grids, banks, healthcare, and tech companies are all targets for foreign intelligence entities seeking to exploit insiders. The rise of remote work has further expanded this vulnerability; when staff are dispersed and less supervised, it’s harder to detect anomalous behavior, and adversaries find new social engineering angles. Indeed, the shift to widespread telework during the COVID-19 era “widened the attack surface for insider threats” as employees became more isolated and susceptible to exploitation or error.

Insider threats can take many forms, from espionage to sabotage. Notable examples include:

• Espionage or Intellectual Property Theft: Insiders illicitly copy sensitive data, such as trade secrets, R&D, or classified info, to benefit a foreign government or competitor. (For example, an engineer might steal designs for a new chip or aircraft and send them to an overseas contact.)

• Sabotage: A rogue insider deliberately disrupts or damages systems, infrastructure, or data integrity. This could mean planting malware, physically tampering with equipment, or otherwise impairing operations from within.

• Fraud and Financial Theft: Insiders abuse their access for illicit financial gain, e.g. embezzling funds, conducting unauthorized transactions, or committing identity theft using internal data.

• Security Breaches (Unauthorized Access or Disclosure): This includes cases like an employee letting an uncleared person into a secure facility or leaking confidential information. Even when not done for foreign espionage, such breaches can be exploited by adversaries.

Each of these insider scenarios has occurred in recent years. In the realm of economic espionage alone, employees have been caught stealing proprietary tech to sell or pass to foreign agents. Insiders have sabotaged data centers and critical software with logic bombs. Others have been prosecuted for leaking classified materials. The statistics underscore the risk: roughly 30% of all data breaches are caused by insiders, and insider incidents have surged ~47% in the past two years. The U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center’s 2025 report stresses that foreign actors are increasingly targeting personnel in key industries to bypass hardened perimeters. With massive datasets and AI, adversaries can even pinpoint vulnerable insiders (e.g. disgruntled staff or those with financial troubles) by mining social media and leaked info. In short, the insider threat is pervasive and growing; a single insider’s betrayal can defeat millions spent on external cyber defenses. Robust insider threat programs (monitoring, employee awareness, behavior analytics, etc.) and a culture of security are therefore vital to detect and deter these “enemies within.”

2. Cyber Intrusions and Cyber Espionage

Cyber intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and sophisticated criminal groups represent one of the most prominent modern counterintelligence challenges. Nation-state adversaries regularly penetrate government networks, critical infrastructure, and corporate systems to steal sensitive data or even pre-position for disruptive attacks. U.S. authorities have described some recent breaches as “the most widespread and sophisticated hacking campaigns” ever seen. A prime example is the SolarWinds operation discovered in 2020, in which Russian intelligence hackers infiltrated a popular IT management software and, through a malicious update, gained backdoor access into thousands of organizations including multiple U.S. federal agencies. That campaign went undetected for months, underscoring the complexity of today’s cyber espionage. More recently, in 2023, a Chinese state-linked hacking group (dubbed Storm-0558) breached Microsoft cloud email accounts of some 25 organizations, including the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, stealing tens of thousands of officials’ emails in a targeted espionage effort. This incident, which saw unclassified but sensitive diplomatic communications compromised, refocused attention on the scope of Chinese cyber-espionage and the vulnerabilities of even well-defended systems.

Cyber intrusions are not limited to intelligence collection; they can also threaten operations and safety. Critical infrastructure, utilities, transportation, healthcare, etc., has become a frequent target of cyberattacks. Financially motivated ransomware groups (some with suspected ties to hostile states) have caused major disruptions. The FBI reports that over 2 in 5 ransomware attacks reported in 2023 hit organizations in critical infrastructure sectors. We’ve seen hospitals forced offline, city services paralyzed, pipelines and power grids disrupted due to malware. A notorious case was the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack (2021), which forced a major fuel pipeline to shut down, causing gas shortages on the U.S. East Coast; a stark reminder that cybercriminals can spark real-world crises. Whether for espionage or extortion, these cyber intrusions often exploit similar weaknesses (phishing, unpatched software, stolen credentials) and can be co-opted by nation-states. For instance, Iranian or North Korean hackers have used ransomware-style attacks not just for profit but to destroy data or finance sanctioned regimes. The overall trend is a blurring of cyber threats and national security threats. As one DOJ official noted, hostile actors today include not only spy agencies but “criminal organizations targeting non-government information” and even companies flouting sanctions via cyber means. All this makes cybersecurity a core part of counterintelligence. Strong cyber defenses, intelligence sharing about adversary tactics, and incident response plans are now indispensable to counter foreign intrusions. In this arena, speed and agility are key. Defenders must identify breaches quickly, as even a single undetected network compromise can allow an adversary to quietly exfiltrate crown jewels or lay the groundwork for sabotage.

3. Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation

Beyond stealing secrets, foreign adversaries increasingly wage influence campaigns to shape public opinion, policy decisions, and democratic processes to their advantage. These malign influence operations employ both overt and covert tactics, from state media propaganda to clandestine social media manipulation and even the subversion of individuals in key positions. The goal is often to undermine confidence in institutions, sow divisions, and advance the foreign power’s geopolitical interests without firing a shot. U.S. officials have warned that such interference is a serious national security threat, noting that hostile efforts now go “beyond traditional espionage” to include foreign influence and economic pressure.

One glaring arena of foreign influence is in elections and political discourse. Russia has become infamous for its disinformation campaigns. From the 2016 U.S. elections onward, Russian troll farms and intelligence agencies have spread fake news, conspiracy theories, and inflammatory content on American social media; all intended to amplify social discord and sway voters’ perceptions. As the 2024 U.S. elections approached, U.S. agencies publicly warned that Moscow (and to a lesser extent Beijing and Tehran) were again actively trying to “cast doubt on the integrity of the democratic process and sow partisan discord” via online disinformation. These campaigns have grown more sophisticated: recent Russian operations have mimicked legitimate news outlets, deployed AI-generated fake personas and deepfake content, and hired paid influencers to launder propaganda narratives. A DOJ crackdown in 2024 exposed one such covert influence scheme code-named “Doppelganger,” in which Russian actors ran a network of 32 spoofed news websites (impersonating domains like the Washington Post and Fox News) and social media ads to spread Kremlin propaganda and interfere in the 2024 U.S. election. The campaign, directed by Putin’s administration, pushed narratives to reduce support for Ukraine and boost pro-Russia politicians, all while hiding its origin. U.S. authorities seized the domains and sanctioned those involved, but the episode shows the breadth of tools in play: cyber, media, and influence tradecraft blended together.

China and other nations also engage in influence operations, though often with different methods. Beijing tends to focus on long-term influence: cultivating academics, business leaders, and even local politicians to quietly advance pro-China positions. A striking recent case saw a former New York state government aide (Linda Sun) charged in 2024 with secretly acting as an agent of China; she allegedly used her position to block Taiwan-friendly initiatives and promote China’s agenda, while receiving millions in payments and lavish gifts. This kind of “agent of influence” case blurs the line between classic espionage and influence peddling. It demonstrates that foreign governments will even infiltrate state and local institutions to exert leverage from within. Meanwhile, China also conducts massive information campaigns targeting Chinese diaspora communities and Western media, aiming to shape narratives about issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong, or its human rights record. Iran and others have run influence campaigns as well. For example, Iran has impersonated online personas to spread divisive content in the U.S. and to intimidate dissidents abroad.

The common thread across these influence operations is that they exploit the openness of democratic societies. Social media, news outlets, academia, and political systems can be turned into battlegrounds by foreign manipulators. The threat is not only misinforming the public but also eroding trust, in elections, in factual truth, in the very fabric of civic cohesion. Countering this challenge is tricky: it requires a combination of intelligence work (to attribute and expose foreign influence), robust enforcement of laws like the Foreign Agents Registration Act (to prosecute unregistered foreign agents), tighter security for electoral systems, and public education on media literacy. Recent efforts include FBI and DHS public-service campaigns warning voters about fake news and urging skepticism of alarming, anonymous online claims. In short, shining light on the disinformation tactics is crucial. As the Director of National Intelligence and FBI jointly stated, resilience against foreign influence calls for “transparency about foreign efforts” and vigilance from government, the private sector, and the public alike. The battle for hearts and minds has become a core front in counterintelligence.

4. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Weak Links in the Chain

In today’s interconnected world, adversaries are increasingly targeting the supply chains of software, hardware, and services as a stealthy way to compromise otherwise secure organizations. Supply chain attacks involve inserting malicious components or exploitable weaknesses at upstream suppliers, so that when the product or update reaches the true target, it already carries the compromise. This indirect approach can yield massive payoffs; a single successful supply chain attack can potentially open backdoors into thousands of companies or government offices. U.S. officials warn that exploitation of supply chains by foreign adversaries, especially combined with cyber and insider tactics, is a complex and growing threat to critical economic sectors and infrastructure. In effect, the “weakest link” in the chain (an outside vendor, manufacturer, or software library) can become the point of entry for espionage or sabotage.

Software supply chain attacks have shown how damaging this method can be. The SolarWinds Orion breach is a case in point. In 2020, Russian intelligence operators compromised the update mechanism of SolarWinds, a trusted IT management software used widely in both government and industry. By trojanizing a software update, they distributed malware to roughly 18,000 downstream customers, including U.S. federal agencies and Fortune 500 firms. Only a subset of those were actively exploited, but the victims included the Departments of Treasury, State, and others, making it one of the most far-reaching espionage intrusions in history. The attack was covert and sophisticated, evading detection for many months, and highlighted the urgent need to secure software development pipelines. Similarly, in 2022-23, suspected North Korean hackers inserted backdoors into open-source software packages that many companies unwittingly incorporated into their applications, showing even the open-source supply chain is at risk. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, state-sponsored hackers in the last decade have compromised software and IT service supply chains to facilitate espionage and even potential pre-positioning for sabotage. This has prompted an “all hands-on deck” effort to shore up supply chain security; including new federal regulations and collaboration with tech providers to ensure code integrity, vulnerability disclosure, and multi-factor authentication in development environments.

Hardware and physical supply chains are another worry. If an adversary can sabotage or spy on critical hardware components (chips, network equipment, industrial machinery) at the point of manufacture or transit, they can potentially compromise every system that uses that hardware. A recent eye-opening example involves the giant cranes used at American seaports. In early 2025, a congressional investigation found that approximately 80% of the ship-to-shore cargo cranes at U.S. ports were made by a Chinese state-owned company, and these cranes contained hidden hardware (undeclared cellular modems) that could allow remote monitoring or control by China. In the worst case, an adversary could shut down or sabotage port operations via these covert backdoors, crippling the flow of goods. Given that 40% of U.S. imports by value pass through the Los Angeles/Long Beach ports alone, the impact of such manipulation could be enormous; empty store shelves and economic disruption, as lawmakers warned. A former U.S. cybersecurity official even called the situation “the number one cyber risk facing the United States right now.” Beyond cranes, concerns have been raised about telecom equipment from foreign suppliers (like 5G network gear) that might include “kill switches” or espionage capabilities. In 2018, for instance, it was reported (though later contested) that Chinese-made server motherboards were found with tiny clandestine chips to spy on cloud providers; illustrating the kind of nightmare supply chain scenario that keeps security teams up at night.

Overall, supply chain vulnerabilities compound the counterintelligence challenge because they extend the threat surface globally. An organization might have excellent internal security but still be compromised through a contractor’s compromised tool or a counterfeit component. Adversaries know this and will seek out the path of least resistance. To mitigate the risk, the U.S. government has pushed for initiatives to “reduce opportunities for exploitation” in supply chains. This includes stricter vetting of suppliers, diversification to avoid single points of failure (as the State Department is now moving towards a more “hybrid” multi-vendor cloud environment after the Microsoft email breach), continuous monitoring for tampered products, and information sharing about threats. The private sector is adopting frameworks for supply chain risk management and zero-trust principles that assume no product or update is implicitly safe. As the NCSC notes, we must “build resilience” and deny adversaries access at multiple points, from concept to design, manufacture, deployment, and maintenance of critical supply chains. In essence, securing the supply chain has become as vital as securing one’s own perimeter.

5. Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property Theft

Economic espionage, the theft of trade secrets and intellectual property, is a high-impact counterintelligence threat affecting governments and businesses alike. When foreign nations steal advanced technology or business secrets, they undermine a country’s economic competitiveness and national security advantages. The United States has pointed explicitly to China as the most prolific culprit in this arena. In fact, about 80% of all economic espionage prosecutions by the U.S. Department of Justice involve activity that would benefit the Chinese state. Additionally, around 60% of trade secret theft cases have a nexus to China. These staggering figures (as of 2021) illustrate a trend that has likely continued: Beijing has a massive, multi-faceted effort to acquire cutting-edge tech and know-how from abroad by illicit means, as part of its national strategy to dominate emerging industries. Of course, other countries engage in economic espionage too (Russia, for instance, has targeted energy and aerospace secrets, and there have been cases of Iranian and even allied-nation espionage for commercial gain), but Chinese espionage is unrivaled in scale by official assessments.

What kinds of information are targeted? Virtually anything of commercial or strategic value: semiconductor designs, source code, pharmaceutical formulas, AI algorithms, aerospace and defense engineering, agricultural IP (seeds, for example), manufacturing processes; you name it. Adversaries use a range of methods to steal these secrets. Cyber intrusions are common (hacking into company networks or university research labs to exfiltrate data). So are insider recruitment and co-optee: a foreign intelligence service might bribe or pressure an employee to hand over proprietary data. Front companies and joint ventures are another avenue, where a foreign partner gains access to technology under the guise of business collaboration. Even legal avenues like academic exchanges can be abused, e.g. visiting researchers might illicitly copy data or take advanced knowledge home. The cost of economic espionage is enormous: the United States estimates hundreds of billions of dollars per year in lost value, translating to lost jobs and diminished military-technological edge.

Recent cases highlight how this threat is evolving. In February 2025, U.S. prosecutors unveiled charges against Linwei “Leon” Ding, a former Google software engineer, accusing him of stealing Google’s AI technology secrets to benefit two Chinese companies. According to the indictment, Ding had been secretly working with a Chinese startup and exfiltrated over a thousand files, including blueprints for Google’s AI model training infrastructure and specialized semiconductor designs, presumably to help China leap ahead in the AI race. This case, which was part of a new “Disruptive Technology Strike Force” targeting such thefts, exemplifies the insider-facilitated IP theft that is so prevalent. Another high-profile conviction in recent years was that of a Chinese intelligence officer, Yanjun Xu, who tried to steal advanced jet engine designs from U.S. aerospace companies by recruiting insiders; he became the first Chinese MSS (spy agency) officer extradited to the U.S. and was sentenced in 2022. And it’s not only high-tech: even corn seeds were the target of a Chinese national caught digging them up from Iowa test fields in a case some years ago, showing the breadth of what counts as valuable IP.

The national security implications of economic espionage are real. If an adversary nation can save billions in R&D by stealing U.S. innovations, it can pour more resources into military expansion or undercut U.S. industries in the global market. For example, stolen semiconductor designs can advance a rival’s military computing power; stolen pharmaceutical research can be weaponized or used to undermine a U.S. biotech firm. FBI Director Christopher Wray noted that Chinese espionage is so widespread that the FBI opens a new China-related counterintelligence case every 12 hours on average. In one illustrative quote, the DOJ said that China’s economic espionage and trade secret theft “threatens the technologies and intellectual property of the United States and the world”. The response has included stepping up prosecutions (the DOJ’s now-concluded “China Initiative” led to multiple arrests of spies and insiders), tightening investment screening (to block Chinese state-linked entities from acquiring sensitive U.S. tech companies), and improving corporate security awareness. Companies are encouraged to treat their crown jewels with the same protection one would give classified info; using need-to-know access, monitoring unusual data access, and swiftly investigating insider red flags. Internationally, there have been diplomatic repercussions too, for instance, the U.S. in 2020 ordered closed a Chinese consulate (in Houston) explicitly because it was seen as a hub for economic spying. The message is that economic espionage is not just a private-sector problem; it’s a core part of geopolitical competition, and defending trade secrets has become a matter of national security.

6. Hostile Tradecraft and Classical Espionage Tactics

Even as cyber and data-driven threats loom large, traditional human espionage (“spy vs. spy”) is alive and well, and in some ways more complex than ever. Foreign intelligence services continue to deploy classic tradecraft on U.S. soil: recruiting spies, planting undercover operatives, and running clandestine operations to steal secrets or seed influence. Today’s counterintelligence professionals must contend not only with digital adversaries, but also with trained human agents using false identities, bribes, blackmail, and surveillance tradecraft to achieve their aims. In many cases, these old-school methods intertwine with modern tech (spies might use encrypted apps, dead drops in the dark web, etc.), but the fundamental threat of an enemy agent on the inside remains potent.

A stark recent example came in August 2023, when U.S. authorities arrested two Navy sailors in California for allegedly spying on behalf of China. These servicemen, one stationed on a warship, another at a naval base, were charged with passing sensitive military information to Chinese intelligence officers in exchange for cash. The secrets in question ranged from technical manuals and blueprints of Navy ships to details of U.S. military exercises in the Indo-Pacific. By exploiting financially motivated insiders (neither sailor initially had obvious ties to China), Beijing’s operatives were able to obtain valuable defense intel straight from the source. This case underscores that foreign agents are actively targeting U.S. personnel, in the military, government, and defense contractors, using age-old recruitment techniques. Whether through monetary inducements, ideological appeals, or coercion, adversaries try to develop “assets” who can quietly feed them information. From a counterintelligence perspective, catching such moles is notoriously challenging, as seen in historical spy scandals (Robert Hanssen, for instance, spied for the Russians from inside the FBI for over 20 years before his 2001 arrest). The Navy sailor arrests show that the threat is not just history, it’s current and ongoing.

Another aspect of hostile tradecraft is the use of cover identities and front organizations. Russian intelligence is infamous for operating “illegal” spies; deep-cover agents who live for years under assumed identities (often posing as ordinary citizens or businesspeople) to infiltrate targets. A ring of such illegals was exposed in the U.S. in 2010 (the Anna Chapman case), and European countries have recently caught Russian illegals in Europe as well. Meanwhile, more overt cover is also used: for example, intelligence officers might pose as diplomats in an embassy (protected by diplomatic immunity) while secretly running spy operations under that cover. This is why Russia’s diplomatic presence in various countries has been cut back; dozens of Russian “diplomats” have been expelled in recent years on suspicion of espionage. China has used non-official cover too; there have been cases of alleged Chinese agents posing as journalists or scholars to get close to targets. In 2022, the UK identified a Chinese woman who had become a parliamentary researcher as a suspected agent working to influence British politicians; showing that democratic institutions are squarely in the crosshairs.

Adversaries are also leveraging tradecraft in targeting diaspora communities and dissidents. For instance, the FBI has charged individuals acting on behalf of the Chinese government with conducting surveillance, harassment, and even attempted forcible repatriation of Chinese dissidents on U.S. soil; part of a global campaign known as “Operation Fox Hunt.” Such transnational repression is a modern twist on espionage, where the aim is to silence critics abroad rather than steal secrets, but it still involves covert agents and spy craft within the United States, violating U.S. law and sovereignty.

Finally, technical surveillance and collection platforms remain a concern. Not all espionage is person-to-person; some is machine-to-machine. One headline-grabbing incident was the Chinese spy balloon of February 2023; a high-altitude balloon that drifted across the continental U.S., including over sensitive military sites, before the U.S. shot it down. It was later reported that the balloon was likely conducting signals intelligence collection (snooping on electronic communications from bases) and transmitting data back to Beijing in real time. The balloon’s incursion “triggered a major national security incident and a diplomatic row,” as it brazenly violated U.S. airspace and led the U.S. to postpone a high-level diplomatic visit to China. This unusual episode shows that adversaries will sometimes employ novel or even seemingly low-tech spy platforms to catch us off guard. Drones, satellites, undersea cables, and listening devices are all part of the espionage playbook too. Countering these requires not just human counterespionage but coordination with air defense, law enforcement, and technical experts.

In sum, hostile tradecraft spans both humans and technology, and often the two in tandem. A foreign agent might use an implant to steal data, or a cyber hacker might rely on an insider’s credentials. The blending of techniques makes counterintelligence a complex cat-and-mouse game. U.S. strategies now emphasize disrupting the “critical enablers” of foreign espionage, for example, denying adversaries the ability to travel freely by indicting spies (even if they can’t be arrested abroad, naming and shaming can limit their utility), tightening visa screenings for suspected intelligence officers, and aggressively exposing spy networks. Intelligence and security agencies also work on continuous monitoring and insider threat detection to catch spying activities early. However, the reality is that some level of foreign spying will persist; the key is to constrain it and protect the most sensitive assets. Through diligent counter-surveillance, double-agent operations, and old-fashioned investigative work, successes do occur. (For instance, in 2021 the U.S. convicted an MSS agent for attempting to recruit an aviation engineer; a case that revealed a lot about Chinese tradecraft.) The enduring lesson is that while technologies change, the art of espionage adapts rather than disappears. Modern counterintelligence must therefore fight on multiple fronts: cyber, human, and everything in between.

7. Conclusion: An Urgent Call for Vigilance and Integration

As the above illustrates, the threat landscape for counterintelligence is broader and more complex than ever. No longer is it just a spy vs. spy game in the shadows; it’s now an all-domain contest ranging from your company’s server room to the smartphone in your pocket, from the ballot box to the factory floor. Critically, these threats often intersect. A single adversary operation might combine multiple vectors, for example, a foreign intelligence service could recruit an insider at a contract company, use a cyber intrusion to augment their access, and exfiltrate data via a supply chain backdoor, all in one campaign. Indeed, the NCSC warns that such combined tactics (insiders + cyber + supply chain exploitation) represent a “complex and growing threat” to U.S. economic and national security. This means our defenses must likewise be interlocking and coordinated.

The urgency cannot be understated. These counterintelligence challenges carry real consequences: blunted military superiority, stolen innovations, manipulated public discourse, and weakened critical systems. In the worst case, a successful act of espionage or sabotage could cost lives or fundamentally alter the strategic balance. Recognizing this, the U.S. has updated its National Counterintelligence Strategy in 2024 to focus on priority areas like protecting critical infrastructure, safeguarding supply chains, defending American democracy from malign influence, and building resiliency against insider threats. A key theme is integration, aligning efforts across agencies and partnering with the private sector and allies. Effective counterintelligence in the modern era demands a “whole-of-society” approach, engaging not only government experts but also industry leaders, academia, and the informed public. Education and awareness are our first line of defense: when employees can spot phishing or know to report suspicious behavior, when voters can discern fake news, when executives factor security into business decisions, the adversaries’ job gets harder.

In practical terms, progress is being made. Organizations are instituting insider threat detection programs and zero-trust cybersecurity architectures. Law enforcement has ramped up economic espionage prosecutions and foreign agent indictments, sending a clear deterrent message. Intelligence agencies are sharing more threat intelligence with the companies and sectors at risk. And public awareness initiatives, like FBI-led campaigns on foreign influence and technology theft, are shining light on activities that once thrived in the shadows.

Still, the battle is ongoing. The complexity and dynamism of these threats mean there is no finish line; counterintelligence is a continuous mission. As adversaries innovate and find new ways to strike, the U.S. and its partners must outmaneuver and adapt. The tone we must adopt is one of serious, steady vigilance without veering into paranoia. We want an informed public and workforce that can help guard our security, while still protecting the openness and freedoms that are our strengths. In facing insider threats, cyber intrusions, influence ops, supply chain hacks, economic espionage, and clandestine spies, America’s greatest asset will be its unity and resilience. By understanding these threats and working together, we can harden our defenses and ensure that our national security and way of life are safeguarded against those who would undermine them.

Sources: Recent government and industry reports and news on counterintelligence threats were used to inform this overview, including DOJ, FBI, NCSC releases and reputable news outlets covering espionage and cybersecurity incidents. Key references highlight the trends and cases discussed, among others. These illustrate the breadth of modern CI challenges and the imperative for a comprehensive response.